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THE RISE AND RUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND SCHOLARSHIP
FOR

many members of the legal community, the signal achievement of the

past two decades has been the rise of administrative law. The 1964
decision of Ridge v. Baldwin 1 has been hailed as a "milestone in the
history of judicial pronouncements" 2 and the birthdate of the revival of
administrative law in England.3 Roused from their slumbers, the judicial
Rip Van Winkles have taken the State to task and imposed a strenuous
regime of administrative legality. In the slipstream of this judicial
activity, there has been a corresponding surge of academic interest and
output. While other regions of the common law atrophy and die,4
administrative law and scholarship is pronounced healthy and thriving.
After 21 years, administrative law has come of age; the best is yet to
come. Against such an exciting and optimistic backdrop, this article seeks
to present a more realistic scenario, presently depressing but potentially
exciting. It argues that the doctrine of judicial review of administrative
action is quantitatively insignificant and qualitatively indeterminate. As
such, this article unashamedly picks up the gauntlet thrown down by
Patrick McAuslan and accepts his challenge to carry out an ideological
analysis of the current system and to experiment with new theories of
administrative law.5 It is a self-conscious attempt "to live dangerously,
to chance [my] arm and philosophise. "6
The rise of administrative law and scholarship is a ruse. For all the

ballyhoo, the impact of the law on the administrative process is marginal.
The

rhetoric is

far

removed from the

reality. The importance of

administrative law lies in its ideological rather than its instrumental function.
Administrative law and scholarship facilitate and legitimate administrative
power whose exercise and abuse they exist to constrain and eradicate.7 In so
far as the supposed need and justification for judicial review is premised on
democratic inertia or indifference and legislative impotence or overwork,
attention must switch to these institutional evils. The reform and revitalisation
of the democratic organs of government must be adopted and pursued. An
ounce of democratic prevention is better than a pound of judicial cure. The
vast institutional and intellectual resources invested in administrative law and
scholarship must be redeployed.

Of course, to criticise administrative law and to advocate the
abolition of judicial review is not to approve of maladministration. As
presently constituted, administrative agencies and tribunals are as
undemocratic as the courts. Yet, a commitment to criticism represents
a constructive step towards an effective control of the administrative
process. The courts are constitutionally and democratically incapable
of acting as a "bridle for [the administrative] Leviathan."8 Indeed, "the
proclaimed revival of judicial review
. . . is really wishful thinking by academic commentators and judges. "9 Also,
a troubling paradox lies at the heart of this resurgent activity. The aim and
rationale of judicial intervention in the administrative process is to avoid a
monopoly of power with its tendency to corrupt and to curtail individual

freedom. Yet, in so doing, the judges are open to the charge that this
reinforces their own monopolistic position and power.

Sadly, as so often, legal academics have allowed themselves, unwittingly
or otherwise, to be used as ideological apologists, · identifying political
impartiality and conceptual coherence in the jumble of decisions. They
recognise an appropriate and realisable role for the courts in supervising
the legality of administrative acts, while leaving their substantive merits
to political modes of control.10 Yet, there is developing a powerful critique
of this traditional scholarship. 11 In this sense, the present article does_
not make any claims to originality or novelty. However, it does adopt a
very different methodology which offers a more structured, sustained and
cogent account of the workings of administrative law and the legal
process generally. Whereas other critics retain a lingering faith in the
potential efficacy of judicial review, suitably reformed and reconstituted,
this article suggests that the retention of any form of judicial review
cannot be justified if our democratic commitments and ambitions are
taken seriously.
It is the burden of this article to substantiate these claims which will

appear extravagant, if not actually offensive, to many. It is a modest
essay in Critical Legal Scholarship. 12 It will suggest the new democratic
paths to be explored, if the administrative process is to serve the
genuine interests of the governed. The article is divided into four
sections. First, the theoretical foundations of the critique will be

sketched and the problematic relation between the individual and the
State introduced. Secondly, an analysis of the courts' handling of
administrative disputes is offered. This section forms the bulk of the
paper and touches upon different aspects of the judicial process,
including its doctrinal indeterminacy and its practical marginality.
Although far from exclusive, there is a strong focus on the saga of the
G.L.C.'s "Fares Fair" scheme. Thirdly, a critical survey of the
burgeoning scholarly literature is presented which focuses upon its
theoretical reductionism and its constructivist inadequacies. Finally, some
positive and tentative proposals for reform are put forward.

I. LAW, STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL: THE CONTRADICTION OF LEGAL
DOCTRINE

A. A Critical Prolegomena

In all its guises, Western thought has been devoted to containing the
corrosive and subversive messages of social contradiction and historical
contingency. Political and legal theory has sought to deny two
fundamental and related truths. First, there is no natural or necessary
form of social life. Existing social arrangements can lay no claim to
objective or universal validity. They represent nothing more than
temporary and historical solutions to the problems of human
interaction. There is no one true, enduring and ahistorical form of

social existence. Secondly, this historical contingency feeds upon the
contradiction in social life between the individual and the community. 13
Both individualists and communitarians insist that there exists a mere
conflict which can be rationally resolved and the resulting solution be
possessed of

objective

moral

force.

Yet, there is actually a

contradiction between individual choice and communal control. They
are

antithetical

concepts

and

defy compromise

or mediation.

Interaction with others is both necessary to and incompatible with
freedom. Communal control protects and facilitates individual freedom
as well as threatening to overwhelm it. In crude terms, whereas
communitarianism sacrifices the individual to the collective will,
liberalism worships the individual at the expense of the communal
good. An individual is more than an automatic functionary of some
holistic society or an obsessive egoist in an alienated world.
The universe of legal discourse is profoundly and complexly implicated in
this political struggle. The enterprise of adjudication and legal scholarship
serves to clothe social arrangements with the essential garments of
legitimacy. Judges and scholars contribute to the prevailing ideology or
mind-set which insists that the present organisation of society is not only
rational and just, but necessary and inevitable. Moreover, the construction of
elaborate schemes of legal rights and entitlements from available legal
materials helps to justify the status quo and erect formidable barriers to
social change. Although hierarchy and domination are rife within society, the

ideal of governance according to the rule of law masks these offensive
facts. By pretending that legal outcomes are the product of apolitical and
neutral modes of argument rather than the imposed preferences of an
arbitrary hierarchy, the rule of law contributes to the transformation of an
illegitimate world of social disorder into a legitimate world of legal right.
Legal thought operates as an intellectual tool for the suppression of historical
contingency and the denial of social contradiction. It helps to obscure the
fundamental truth that everything is in the irresistible process of becoming and
not being. Modern legal thought offers itself as a timeless way of
understanding and conquering the world. Nevertheless, the universe of legal
discourse does not provide a true mirror-image of the socio-political culture.
There is an element of distortion. In Kuhnian terms, the proliferation of
"anomalies" makes untenable the establishment and defence of a crude and
directcausal nexus between the material conditions of social life and its
legal superstructure. 14 While the extant legal materials are constitutive of a
social system and sustain in part the existing hierarchy, it is fanciful to suggest
that a "capitalistic" social system, able to weather

the storms of welfare

statism and industrial nationalisation, necessitates a particular regime of legal
rules. 15 Consequently, the law is not simply an institutional instrument at the
disposal of the ruling hierarchy. It possesses some "relative autonomy." The
historical consciousness reigns, but does not

govern absolutely. The need for legitimation is so strong that it may
best serve the dominant groups in society to encourage or permit
some decisions which benefit the dominated. As E. P. Thompson

concludes:
"The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal
more than sham. In the same moment they may modify, in
profound ways, the behaviour of the powerful, and mystify the
powerless. They may disguise the true realities of power, but, at
the same time, they may curb that power and check its
intrusions."16
The law is like a dog on a long leash. Although it will ultimately
follow the lead of its political master, it has considerable range of
movement. It

can wander from the chosen path

and cause

considerable damage and frustration.
Accordingly, the outcome of struggles within the legal arena are not
dictated solely by the whims of the dominant hierarchy. Legal doctrine
does not conform to any simple logic and is unified only by its
enduring indeterminacy; there exists "a permanent disequilibrium of
doctrine." 17 With imagination and industry, legal materials can be
organised so as to support radically inconsistent positions. Indeed,
most modern legal theorists have conceded that "law . . . is deeply and
thoroughly political," but they contrive to insist that it is "not a
matter of personal or partisan politics. "18 Abandoning the high
ground of formalism, they search for a "background theory" which
shows the legal data in their best light as precepts of political morality.

Yet the very diversity of theories offered undermines the enterprise.
In so far as it is possible to defend a variety of plausible theories,
no one proposal can lay claim to exclusivity or universality.

19

Meaningful interpretation is only possible where there already exists a
commitment to a shared set · of values. However, as in the political
domain, the legal territory is a focus of conflict. There is a
pervasive

matrix

of

contradictory forces which prevents the

establishment of a sufficiently full tradition of shared understandings.
The indeterminacy of legal doctrine finds its energy and power in
the antithetical modalities of individual and community. This deep
logic of contradiction sustains and ensures an inescapable scheme of
doctrinal indeterminacy. Doctrine can be consistently converted into
its own opposite self-image.

B. The Administrative State and its Citizens

The courts are a venue for the unending struggle between the competing
world visions. Although fundamentally contradictory, they are believed in
and espoused at the same time. In mistakenly viewing these visions as
capable of compromise or mediation, judges and lawyers are not active
participants in some vast Machiavellian plot; they are conscientious players
in an irresistible and endless game of social chess. The problem lies not so
much in their self-imposed, although rarely realised, utopian ambition, but in
the hopelessness of making anything more than intuitive, ad hoc guesses at

the desirability of any particular social arrangement. The judge and legal
scholar cannot evade the role of social visionary. The dialectical tension
between individualism and communitarianism generates competing legal
principles that march in pairs throughout the law. While the doctrinal
manifestations of one vision may temporarily gain the upper hand and
whole areas of doctrine appear uncontroversial, the insoluble quality of the
contradiction guarantees that renewed struggle is always close at hand. The
alternate vision can be contained, but can never be obliterated. There is no
logical or natural point at which one vision ends and the other begins. At
every turn, choices must be made.
The esoteric and convoluted nature of legal discourse is the direct
consequence of the need to obscure this inescapable element of judicial
choice. Rather than "arbitrate conflict through the impartial elaboration of a
mechanical legal analytic,"20 the judge is a political and creative actor. To
judge is to choose. The evolution of legal doctrine comprises an endless series
of fragile and makeshift compromises

between

contradictory

ideals.

Importantly, there is no meta-theory available for determinate guidance.
Legal discourse is nothing more than a stylised version of political
discourse. Legal materials comprise a repository of technical resources by
which to naturalise and universalise the temporary structures that interrupt the
flow of social history. Yet, the analysis is not nihilistic. It treats legal
doctrine seriously. Law is not a jumble of unintelligible materials, but is
shaped by the deep and contradictory structure that informs contemporary
hierarchical society. The vitality and history of the common law can be

traced to the continuous oscillation between competing social visions. This
dialectical drama is most openly played out in the arena of administrative
law where social concerns and individual interests collide head-on. As one
prominent commentator notes, the challenge is "to balance action taken on
behalf of the public at large against the interests of a single individual whose

rights . . . may be affected by the exercise of the public power. "21
As abstract and ahistorical visions, individualism and communitarianism
represent

highly

stylised

ends

of

an

ideological

spectrum.

Individualism represents a world consisting of independent and selfsufficient persons who confidently draw up and robustly pursue their own
life-plans. Values and tastes are relative and subjective; individuals seek
to maximise their own preferences. The legal system supports such a
regime by protecting private property, enforcing bargains and creating
autonomous spheres of action.22 At the other extreme, communitarianism
comprises a world made up of interdependent and co-operating persons.
Recognising the vulnerability of individuals, it encourages greater
solidarity and altruism. There exists a central belief in the possibility of
communal values and the capacity to know a common good that
cannot be known alone. The legal system contributes to such a regime
by dismantling private property, regulating the distribution of resources
and providing for interactive projects.23 However, each vision represents
only a partial and incomplete depiction of social life and its possibilities.
Neither is reliable or realisable as an exclusive basis for social

organisation. Individualism must depend upon some "nightwatchman
State" to guarantee the conditions for effective individual achievement.
Similarly, communitarianism must acknowledge the claims of individuals
to their own tastes and preferences. Both atomism and holism are
unworkable and indefensible. However, once the viability of the spectral
extremes is denied, the slide into doctrinal indeterminacy is ensured.
An actual example will clarify this argument. A persistent problem
for administrative lawyers is to determine the circumstances in which an
individual is entitled to an administrative hearing. Traditional legal
scholars are obliged by their own jurisprudential premises24 to claim
that there is some neutral calculus which generates a coherent and
consistent doctrine of "hearings." But the actual practice repudiates the
theory.25 In extreme terms, there exists a stark choice between "no
hearing" and a "full hearing." These options crudely reproduce the basic
contradiction.

26

A "no hearing" doctrine would pull towards

communitarianism with its implicit assumptions that the public good
outweighs individual interests and that decisions are best made in
terms of community solidarity. A "full hearing" doctrine, while
accepting that the public good might be preferred over individual
rights, maintains that individuals ought to be given the fullest
opportunity to defend and argue their own individual claims. In so far
as traditional legal thought is premised on the necessary and realisable

reconciliation of

the

competing

interests

of

individuals

and

community, it would be the negation of its very raison d'etre to opt
completely for either extreme. Doctrine vacillates. Neither legal
logicians nor policy analysts can provide objective guidance as to
where doctrine ought to position itself along the continuum.
While the dominant principle in contemporary doctrine favours a "full
hearing,"27 there exists a counter-principle which concedes that "no hearing"
is justified in certain circumstances. 28 However, once a valid communitarian
component is admitted, it must be arbitrarily held in check or else it will
consume the whole doctrine. At any time, the discrete legal pieces could be
rearranged into a completely different doctrinal jigsaw. Determinacy is
contrived, superficial and ephemeral. The still waters of legal doctrine run
deep and dangerous. The apparent calm is continuously being disturbed. So
much so that surface determinacy must give way to deep indeterminacy.
Ever present, the doctrinal struggle most clearly manifests itself in "instances
of exemplary difficulty"29 ; cases where the tension between contradictory
forces and its previous suppression become so volatile that the tenuous
coherence of doctrine is shattered. Along with a broader systemic analysis,
these recalcitrant instances will comprise the critical focus of the paper.

C. Substance and Symbol

It is often said that Britain has become a socialist state. Indeed, as early as
1905, Dicey opined that the years from 1865 to 1900 were a "period of
collectivism. "30 While it is true that Britain has added the trappings of a

welfare state, society remains founded upon the individualistic
institutions of private property and private enterprise. Notwithstanding
the demise of laissez-faire capitalism, British society is dominated by
the commitment to industrial profitability.

31

There is a large public

sector, subject to governmental regulation, but the vast amount of
wealth and power is still wielded by private interests. In retrospect, the
move from a market economy toward a more mixed economy occurred
to avert crisis and to enable the continued expansion of private capital
accumulation.32 The governmental apparatus has fallen captive to
large-scale business corporations which are, in turn, controlled by a
small coterie of privileged individuals. The creation of a large public
sector has facilitated the concentration of economic power as much as
its redistribution. While benefiting many, the welfare state has acted as
a prop for beleaguered private centres of economic and political
domination. Any loss in autonomy has been adequately compensated for
by greater material gains. Moreover, the expansion of the regulatory
state has served to divert attention away from the private sector. It has
enabled "the citadels of private power [to remain] insulated from the
risks of party-political conflict. "33
Although Parliament has been the builder of the regulatory state, the
Executive has been the architect. Moreover, Parliament has subcontracted out most of the work. There exists a mammoth administrative

apparatus to implement, monitor and enforce the legion activities of
government. Originally a creature of legislative enactment, the
administrative process has taken on an institutional existence of its own.
This development has profoundly affected the balance and allocation of
power within the British system of governance. Agencies and tribunals
manage the nation's business in accordance with governmental
policies, conceived by the Executive and rubber-stamped by an
obedient Parliament. Few aspects of people's lives from cradle to coffin
are unaffected by the state. Ostensibly in the public good, the state
acts as protector, dispenser of social services, industrial manager,
economic controller and arbitrator.34 Throughout the century, there has
been a marked shift in the governmental centre of gravity. Although
private interest remains the life force, the public process of
administration has become "the pulse of the modern legal order."35
Administrators not only make far more law than legislators, but they
resolve far more disputes than judges.
The legal process has played a major role in distorting this reality.
There is a marked discrepancy between the actual practice of the
administrative process and the picture painted of it by legal doctrine.
This ideological function of the law is of paramount importance.36
Also, in responding to the establishment of the administrative process
as the fulcrum of modern governmental power, the courts have been

dually motivated. First, they have sought to reassert their waning
institutional power and to confirm their essential relevance to the control
of illegitimate power. Some involvement

with

the burgeoning

administrative activities of the state seemed appropriate. However,
secondly, they have been very concerned to justify their own exercise
of power and to adopt a stance that befits their perceived constitutional
responsibilities and powers. Their achievement has been mixed. As an
ideological exercise, they have been successful in persuading people of
their constitutional propriety and effectiveness. As a matter of practical
effect, they have been less successful. Although the history and
development of judicial review is fascinating reading,37 its present status
and ambit that is more important. A doctrinal model of the objectives
and limits of judicial review can be constructed from recent judicial
statements.38 It must be emphasised that this model is not intended to be
an account of what the courts do, but only of what they say they do.

D. The Rhetoric of Judicial Review

The doctrinal model of judicial review centres upon two important
issues; the appropriate division and exercise of governmental power.
Not surprisingly, the dominance of the individualistic vision is marked.
Within society, people are assumed to be constantly at odds and band
together to form a government. Compromise is considered preferable

to the oppressive uncertainty of unrestrained struggle. The limited duty
of the government is to enact a body of norms through which to regulate
the social interaction of its atomistic citizens. To enforce, interpret and
apply these norms, a judicial branch of government must be
established.

39

However, problems of democratic legitimacy arise. This

constitutional dilemma of decision-making is overcome by resort to the
basic dichotomy between values and facts. Whereas values are
considered personal, subjective and arbitrary, facts are taken to be
homogenous, objective and orderly. The legislature is presumed to
operate in the unstable realm of values and has the responsibility to
enact laws designed to achieve substantively just compromise between
competing values. However, once its decisions are translated into a set
of rules, there is a clear shift from the realm of values to the domain
of facts. The Machiavellian world is left behind and the constitutional
Rubicon is crossed. Expressed as a rule, the legislative compromise of
values is converted into fact and becomes amenable to scientific
interpretation and application; "[t]he sovereignty of Parliament runs in
tandem with the rule of objective law."40
In this way, the fundamental democratic demands of popular
consensus, as sought in the legislative process, and rationality, as
embodied in the judicial process, are claimed to be satisfied. Further,
arguments of law and morality are rendered mutually exclusive.

Through the neutral application of rules, the judges are insulated from
political controversy.41 The compulsion to reason within a closed system
of premises guarantees the enduring integrity of the constitutional
compact. Within this constitutional scenario, administrative agencies
only exist as the "executory amanuenses of the legislative will."42
However, overwhelmed and overcommitted, the

legislature must

delegate massive authority to avoid a total paralysis of government.
Inevitably,

this

delegation

becomes an abdication

of

power.

Accordingly, the courts step in to take up the democratic slack. They
perform a constraining function and act as the policing agents of the
legislature. 43 With suitable constitutional deference, judges resist the
temptation to second-guess the exercise of administrative discretion.44 It
is a matter of formal process and not substantive decision. The courts
act as frontier guards between the spheres of state action and citizen
,activity. Legislators are the cartographers and legislative enactments are
the boundary markers. Indeed, the ambit, if not the source, of the
judicial policing power is also conferred and confined by legislation.
To guard against the temptation to establish themselves as
independent power centres, judges claim to adjudicate disputes between
the State and its citizens by the rigorous and faithful implementation of
legislative intent. Neutrality and objectivity is preserved by casting
statutory interpretation as an exercise in linguistic analysis. Judges

search not for what the legislature
intended, but the true meaning of the words used.45 The legislative
expression of the political compromise is treated as a certain fact
whose proper application can and must be determinatively effected
through an impersonal and apolitical set of interpretive techniques.
Furthermore, it is presumed that, unless Parliament states to the
contrary, administrative discretion is subject to the existing common law
rules. The essential quality of their involvement is neatly captured by
Lawton L.J.:
"In the United Kingdom . . . policy is determined by ministers within
the legal framework set out by Parliament. Judges have nothing to do
with either policy making or the carrying out of policy. Their
function is to decide whether a minister has acted within the powers
given him by statute or the common law. If he is declared by a
court, after due process of law, to have acted outside his powers,
he must stop doing what he has done until Parliament gives him
the powers he wants. In a case such as this I regard myself as a
referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of
play; but when the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor
tell the players how to play. "46
In this way, the judges claim to underwrite their constitutional power
and transcend vulgar political debate and still make a valid contribution

to the continued efficacy of the basic compact between the State and its
citizens. Importantly, they claim to do so within the bounds of
constitutional propriety. Yet, the rhetoric of judicial review is not
substantiated by the reality of performance. The judicial achievement
falls hopelessly short of its ambition. Indeed, the ambition is futile. With
the best will, the promise could not be performed. It is the burden of
the next section to support these claims.

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND THE COURTS

A. The Politics of Judicial Policing

In performing its self-acclaimed role as a constitutional police force,
the judiciary promotes an image of impartial obedience and servitude,
faithfully adopting a deferential posture to the will of Parliament.
Indeed, the cornerstone of administrative law has been the notion of
ultra vires. The judicial task is intended to exhaust itself in ensuring
that the administrative process operates within the legislatively ordained
parameters of permissible conduct. Although not the exclusive device of
containment, administrative law is primarily a matter of statutory
interpretation. Accordingly, this section will demonstrate that statutory
interpretation is not a technical and objective activity, but is
inescapably creative and political. Although this characteristic can be
disguised or obscured, it can never be side-stepped or eradicated.

Moreover, the indeterminacy of those politics will be constantly
revealed. As an exhaustive account of the judicial handling of the
administrative process is beyond this paper, a small number of discrete,
but representative topics will be dealt with.
Although the courts insist that statutory interpretation can be effected
apolitically, they nonetheless claim that the power to interpret statutes
is pivotal. It is the courts' construction of legislative words and not
the words themselves that is law.47 Not only is the extent of that power
extremely limited, but the claimed existence of such a power sits
uneasily with their presentation of statutory interpretation as a technical
exercise in linguistic analysis. Whichever one of the great triumvirate
of approaches, "literal," "golden" or "mischief,"48 is used, the courts
"are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what
they said."49 By drawing a marked distinction between the legislative
and the interpretive function, the courts hope to legitimate their power.
But this is little more than a constitutional pose. At a general level, it
can be observed that words do not interpret themselves and that the
analysis of language is not a value-free exercise. For instance, the
courts'

handling of so-called "gaps" in

a statutory scheme is

contradictory and inconsistent.50 Taking a strict stance, the court will
treat the statutory text as exhaustive and strike out the claim as
revealing no legal cause of action. In so doing, the court will have

flouted reality by acknowledging that it cannot generate a solution to
the inevitable batch of "unforeseen" cases. Further, if a liberal stance
is taken, the court will recognise the existence of a "gap" and seek to
fill the legislative silence. To do this, the court will have to resort to
considerations extraneous to the text of the statute. Moreover, the initial
recognition of a gap is
premised on the assumption that the statutory text is not an exhaustive
expression of the sovereign will of Parliament. Adopting either a strict or
liberal riosition, the traditional approach is incomplete and inconsistent.
1

The recent fiasco over the Greater London Council's "Fares Fair"
scheme emphasises the creative dimension of statutory interpretation.52
Under the harsh glare of media-fuelled public interest, the rhetoric of
judicial review was represented and indicted in microcosm. It was an
ironic version of judicial trial by political ordeal. The facts are too
notorious to warrant detailed repetition. After a successful election
campaign, the Labour-controlled G.L.C. instructed the London Transport
Executive (L.T.E.) to reduce bus and tube fares by 25 per cent. The
cost was to be financed by a supplementary levy on the ratepayers. As
a result of the new fares scheme, the Government reduced its block
grant to the G.L.C. This effectively doubled the cost of the reduction
in fares and a supplementary rate precept was issued to all 32 London
boroughs. Bromley L.B.C. sought to quash the imposition of the

supplementary rate and restrain the G.L.C. from continuing with the
new fares scheme. Although the Divisional Court rejected Bromley
L.B.C.'s application on the ground that the G.L.C.'s action lay at the
margin of what is permissible, the Court of Appeal found for Bromley
L.B.C. and held the precept to be null and void. In a unanimous
decision, the House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal.
The thrust of the courts' decisions was that the Transport (London) Act
1969 did not empower the G.L.C. to finance a reduction in fares by a
supplementary precept. Although the G.L.C. had broad policy and
grant-making power over the L.T.E., it was under a duty to promote the
provision of integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and
services for Greater London.
For the House of Lords, the central issue was legality: was the
decision of the G.L.C. within the limited powers that the statute had
conferred upon it? This question of ultra vires could be disposed of by
ascertaining

the

"proper,"53 "true,"54 or

"correct"55 meaning of

"economic." Although the court conceded that the Act was drafted in
"opaque and elliptical language," evidenced "a lack of clarity,"56 was
"vague, possibly with design"57 and, in particular, that the term
"economic" was "chameleon-like," 58 the Law Lords
sought to attach a precise meaning to "economic." Moreover, the
interpretative process was to be "looked at objectively." 59 For instance,

Lords Wilberforce and Diplock recognised that the subsidisation of
public transport from public funds and its treatment as a social service
raised grave and important issues of transport policy, but remained
adamant that it was "a matter of political contr?versJ; . . . ['Yhich the
court] must scrupulously efrain .from entenng." In their own terms, the
Law Lords were msuffic1ently scrupulous. To ignore the debate over
whether transport is a social service supports the view that it is not a
social service. Moreover, failure to inquire into Parliament's contribution
to the debate casts an even greater air of unreality over the attempt at
statuto1;?; interpretation. Although not conclusive of legislative intent,
1

Richard Marsh, then Minister of Transport, in moving the second

reading of the Bill, gave a strong indication of Parliament's stance on
the G.L.C.'s policy and grant-making power:
"This is very important, because if the Council wishes the
executive to do something that will cause it to fall short of its
financial targets, it will itself have to take financial responsibility for it.
The Council might wish, for example, the executive to run a series
of services at a loss for social or planning reasons. It might wish to
keep fares down at a time when costs are rising and there is no
scope for economies. It is free to do so. But 1t has to bear the
cost."62
Rather than face the issue of transport policy squarely and openly, the

Law Lords decided that "the only safe course is to try to understand the
contemporary language."63 In so doing, they concluded that the
"economic" restraint on the G.L.C. meant that it must act in accordance
with ordinary business principles; transport was to be run as a costeffective business enterprise.64 While transport, need not operate at a
profit, it did demand that the
G.L.C. must seek to avoid loss and, certainly, adopt a policy of lossmaking. Lord Scarman left no room for doubt when he said that the
"reduction was adopted not because any higher fare level was
impracticable but as an object of social and transport policy. It was not
a reluctant yielding to economic necessity but a policy preference. In
so doing, the G.L.C. abandoned business principles. That was . . . wrong
in law."65 By placing such a limited definition on "economic," the
House was not only delivering a slap in the face to local democracy,
but was confirming a very clear vision of society. The decision
represents a clear political preference in favour of the ethic of private
enterprise over that of collective consumption.
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Yet, for present

purposes, the existence of that choice is more important than the
nature of that choice.
The meaning of "economic" is far from self-evident. Indeed, it is ludicrous
to suggest that it has one "true" or "correct" meaning. There is a vast
literature on the "economic" operation of public services and nationalised
industries. Whether such organisations should seek to break even,

maximise profit, price discriminate, marginal cost price or the like is moot.
At its broadest, "economic" can refer to any decision that concerns the
distribution or allocation of resources. 67 Also, in a narrow sense, it can be
argued that, as it is not politically or logistically feasible to charge private
road users a realistic cost for the congestion they cause, subsidised
public transport is the next best "economic" policy to reduce congestion
and its costs.68 Also, the extent of the subsidisation by G.L.C. is very
low when compared to the annual investment by other municipalities in
their transportation network.69 Accordingly, the decision to construe
"economic" as meaning "commercially viable" is by no means inevitable or
rationally necessary. It represents a choice. It does not flow inextricably
from the words of the statute, but demands a judicial interlocuter. The
interpretative process is not mechanical or objective, but creative and
relativistic.

Before examining the determinants of that judicial choice, there is a
more subtle and, in a sense, more profound objection to the practice of
judicial

review and statutory interpretation generally. Under the

traditional model, individual interests and preferences are in constant flux.
Therefore, parliamentary

rule-making occurs under conditions

of

uncertainty; a statutory enactment is based on a series of probabilistic
assessments about its impact which in turn depends upon its interaction
with other rules of law and their application to factual situations. Yet, by
defini!ion, although the legal element in this projected scenario will
remain fixed, the nonlegal elements will be continually changing. In

such volatile circumstances, it will be extremely difficult to arrive at
any just compromise of conflicting interests, however temporary or
makeshift. The task of striking a just compromise effective over time will
be practically and theoretically impossible. Further, this unpredictable
interplay of facts and values will not only inhibit the implementation of
the original compromise, but will inadvertently bring into play a whole
new group of generative forces which will support an entirely different
and "unconsented to" compromise. This means that the judge "creates,
through his decision of particular cases, the situation from which will
emerge an as yet indeterminate constellation of legal forces."70
In this way, judges contribute to the future enactments of Parliament.
Their decisions will have a redistributive impact likely to be different to
that intended by Parliament and these will influence the political
struggle whose institutional venue is, of course, Parliament. This is
exactly what has happened in the aftermath of the Bromley case.
Although the decision favoured its position

and policies, the

Government has removed future doubt and successfully introduced a
new Transport Act which imposes stringent controls on locally
subsidised public transport. 71 Consequently, as a contributor to
legislative resources and a creator of the private interests which
effectively constrain and dictate the legislative pronouncements of
Parliament, judges cannot treat statutes "as an external objective factor

validating whatever [they] may choose to do."72 Judges are political
actors and must justify their contribution to the legal process rather
than rely on their activities being justified by it. As such, judges
shoulder the heavy burden of choice.73

B. The Social Visions of Judicial Review

The law of judicial review is one doctrinal venue for the struggle over
the terms and conditions of social life. Doctrinal principles are little
more than historic plots on the legal graph which describes the
contingent resolution of this dialectical tension between competing
social visions. However, individual decisions are selective and amount to
only fragmentary snatches of a more organic vision of social life. In any
particular case, the outcome may be confused or uncertain and it will
often be difficult to estimate which social vision has prevailed. In
others, the decision may clearly represent the victory of one vision
over another. Yet, over the long or medium haul, there will exist
competing trends and conflicting themes. In the shifting sands of legal
doctrine, pockets of stability appear but they are quickly disrupted by
the swirling winds of litigation. Again, G.L.C.'s "Fares Fair" scheme
offers a clear glimpse of this doctrinal indeterminacy. Few argue that
Bromley was not a political decision.74 Moreover, it can be easily
exposed as a blatant attem.gt to frustrate the socialist ambitions of an
elected local authority. 5

Although the House of Lords sought to balance the interests of
ratepayers and transport users, its reliance on a purely formal analytic
ignored their substantive inequalities. The House argued that, as they
represented 40 per cent. of the electorate and provided the major
source of G.L.C. rates revenue, the interests of ratepayers acted as a
legitimate check on G.L.C. programmes. Moreover, as most of the
transport users were not ratepayers, G.L.C. had failed to give sufficient
prominence to the ratepayers' interests.76 On a head-counting basis, the
House's conclusion seems sound and even defensible. Yet, the decision
to attribute electors, ratepayers and transport users with equal formal
status is a choice and not a given. It is part of the legal order and not
the natural order of things. As over 60 per cent. of the rates are
collected from commercial sources, the interests of corporate entities
are given equal or greater weight than the electoral or travelling public.
Accordingly, in the same way that G.L.C. made a choice to prefer
transport users over commercial interests, Bromley represents a contrary
preference. Indeed, as entry to the class of ratepayers is based
exclusively on ownership of private property, the decision clearly
favours the advantaged members of society over the less advantaged.
In visionary terms, Bromley signifies a famous success for the support of
individualism with its emphasis on free enterprise. For many, Bromley
offers cogent evidence for the ideological bias of judicial review.77 Not

only does it undermine any lingering claims about judicial neutrality, but
is brandished as incontrovertible proof of their reactionary politics. Yet,
such rejoicing or mourning is premature. No sooner had the dust been
kicked up, let alone settled, than along came another gust of
litigation.78 Undeterred by its setback in Bromley, G.L.C. resolved to
put into operation an alternative plan. It directed L.T.E. to reduce fares
by 25 per cent.; the 17 per cent. increase in the deficit on L.T.E's
revenue account was to be made good by a grant from G.L.C.
Naturally, L.T.E. doubted the legality of this, so G.L.C. sought various
declarations from the Divisional Court to validate its proposed scheme.
While strenuously claiming to uphold and follow Bromley, the court
held that the "new" scheme was lawful. This volte-face came as as much
of a shock to G.L.C., albeit a pleasant one, as to the legal estblishment.
The attempt to weave the two decisions, both explicitly based on a
true construction of the 1969 Act,79 into the conceptual or ideological
fabric will surely test the ingenuity and dexterity of the most gifted
legal scholar or judge.
The central thrust of the Divisional Court's judgment in Ex parte
G.L.C. seems to be that, whereas, in Bromley, the G.L.C. had arbitrarily
proceeded to put their election promise into effect, the alternative plan
had been arrived at after an informed and considered balancing of the
transport users' and ratepayers' interests. Although the 1969 Act can

reasonably bear such an interpretation, the decision attaches an extremely
generous meaning to Bromley. For most commentators, the ratio of
Bromley is found in its "break-even" and "commercially viable"
requirements.
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Indeed, the Law Lords expressly refer to the actual

policy decision and not just the process of decision-making as being
unreasonable. In the light of such comparisons, the indeterminacy of
legal doctrine seems manifest. If Bromley marks a success for
individualism, Ex p. G.L.C. scores an equally famous victory for
communitarianism or, at least, for the forces of anti-individualism. It
seeks to promote the interests of the public at large over discrete
segments of it. The dust of visionary conflict never settles. It is
constantly blown around by the cross-currents of social struggle.
An equally compelling illustration of the doctrinal indeterminacy of
judicial review is Tameside,81 another politically high-profile decision.
Satisfied that he was acting unreasonably, the Secretary of the State
sought an order of mandamus to force implementation of

a

comprehensive school system, earlier approved by him, but later
postponed by the local authority. The House of Lords held that his
opinion of reasonableness was insufficient per se to justify intervention;
there must be a sufficient factual basis for him to decide that no
reasonable authority would postpone such plans. For many, the
decision was another thinly disguised attempt to maintain the status

quo and frustrate ·efforts to introduce an educational system based on a
more egalitarian model. Yet, less than a year later, the Court of Appeal
reached an entirely contrary result. In Smith,82 the local authority sought
to change the grammar schools into comprehensives. A group of parents
at one grammar school sought to restrain the move. They obtained an
interlocutory injunction from Megarry V.-C., but it was discharged on
appeal. The local authority had not misused their power, which they
exercised in an informed and considered way. In such matters, the court
held that it was fitting that the interests of the whole community prevail
over the views of a discrete group of individuals.83 Clearly, the two
decisions pull in opposite directions; each tacitly sanctions a different
scheme of social arrangements. Although each case involved a separate
statutory provision,84 both cases were disposed of on the basis of the
"reasonable" exercise of discretion. This standard is sufficiently broad
to embrace a wide range of applications. Such a reconciliation of
Tameside and Smith must concede the political nature of the judicial
task. Also, the argument that the courts simply protected the prevailing
political preferences, as expressed in the local democratic process,
against private or governmental interference is extremely difficult to
sustain in light of the views stated in Bromley on the marginal weight to
be given to electoral preferences. 85 Indeed, the conflicting views over
the impact of local elections on an authority's activities gives further

support to the "indeterminacy thesis."
Finally, one more illustration can be drawn from the field of
immigration law. It remains a sad, but undeniable fact that, except in
times of economic expansion, immigrants have not been the favoured
children of the politico-economic establishment. It is startling, therefore,
that at a time of economic recession and legislative tightening of
immigration controls, the courts seem to be taking a strong stand against
the State in favour of what many would consider to be the most
undeserving of characters, the illegal immigrant. I say seem to be
because the performance of the courts in a line of cases ending with
Khawaja
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evidences further the inherent indeterminacy of legal

doctrine. The central question was the proper role of the courts when
the State detains people as illegal entrants and intends to deport them.
More specifically, is the courts' function to determine simply whether
there was sufficient evidence on which immigration officers could
reasonably reach their decisions or whether their decisions are actually
justified on the evidence? In less than a decade, the courts have
embraced all possible solutions. As Lord Bridge noted, this is "a matter
of high constitutional principle affecting the liberty of the subject and
the delineation of the respective functions of the executive and the
judiciary."
Beginning in· 1974 with Azam, 88 it was held that the courts should

review the factual basis on which a finding that a person is an "illegal
entrant" is made and set it aside if it is not justified by the evidence.
This amounts to a "recedent fact" theory of review. However, by 1978
in Hussain, 8 the courts had moved to a "reasonable grounds" approach
which favoured the State. This test was formally approved by the House
of Lords in 1980 in Zamir.90 Yet, early in 1983, the Law Lords
experienced a complete change of heart. In Khawaja, they held
unanimously that the courts' function was to examine the actual
evidence on which the immigration officer's finding was made.
Stressing that the liberty of individuals was at stake and expressly
departing from Zamir, the House decided that reasonableness was an
inappropriate standard of review. Where executive authority is tied to
the precedent establishment of a objective fact, the courts must
determine whether the precedent requirement has been met. In Lord
Scarman's words, "liberty is at stake: that is . . . a grave matter. . .
[and] the reviewing court will therefore require to be satisfied that the
facts which are required for the justification of the restraint put upon
liberty do exist."91
This line of immigration cases underlines most of the major points
made in this section. First, not only is the rhetoric of judicial review
removed from its actual practice, the rhetoric itself is often inconsistent
and contradictory. Far from fulfilling a limited policing function, the

courts have assumed the responsibility, as Lord Wilberforce puts it, "to
see whether [the finding] was properly reached, not only as a matter of
procedure, but also in substance and in law."92 Secondly, in performing
that substantive inquiry, the courts do not consistently favour the
interests of the dominant groups in society. Although taking a proindividualistic position, the protection of illegal immigrants is not
usually considered to be supportive of a conservative ideology. Thirdly,
judicial indecision of the judges subverts the claim that there is a
coherent conceptual pattern imprinted on the judicial fabric. The only
perceivable "pattern" is the constant oscillation between competing
social visions, albeit fragmentedly portrayed and vaguely grasped. The
indeterminacy is natural and inevitable, representing an irrepressible
dimension of the political condition. Judges and scholars cannot avoid
being institutional brokers for competing social ideals. But they do
deserve to be castigated for their efforts to deny the contingent
character of social arrangements, to wrap this basic truth in a pseudoscientific cloak of mystification and to pretend that the present
organisation of society is rational, necessary and just. Their sustained
efforts "make a particular scheme of the possible and desirable forms
of human association stand in place of the indefinite possibilities of
human connection."93

C. The Judicial Ouster of Privative Clauses

The rationale for judicial review is said to be the constitutional and
democratic need to regulate and resist the monopolisation and
arbitrariness of State power. Yet there is discernible within the cases a
less subtle and commendable sub-plot. In checking bureaucratic power,
the courts have extended their own constitutional power. This selfaggrandising tendency is revealed in their handling of "ouster" or
"privative clauses." According to judicial rhetoric, the courts are the
willing servants of the legislative master.94 With Tennyson's Light
Brigade, the judiciary proudly proclaim that "ours is not to reason
why, ours is but to do and die." Consequently, provided it expresses
itself clearly, the legislature is reasonably entitled to expect that the
judges will respect its wish to have them stay out of the administrative
turf. Indeed, they have launched a counter-offensive. The privative
clause is to legislative-judicial relations
"what the Maginot Line was to military tactics: a virtually impregnable
legislative proiect of defence, designed to protect the [administrative
processj from frontal assault. And now it has suffered the same fate. It
has been outflanked by a judicial panzer attack, a virtual constitutional
blitzkrieg. "95
As a general observation, the courts have construed preclusive provisions
so as to limit, rather than debar, judicial involvement in the control of

administrative action. While feigning deference to legislative intent,

the courts' power to review on jurisdictional grounds remains intact in
spite of repeated legislative protestations and no matter how sweeping or
encyclopaedic the clause. It is characterised as "a straightforward
problem of statutory interpretation. "96 In the acclaimed decision of
Anisminic, 97 the House of Lords held that a statutory provision that "the

determination by the [Foreign Compensation] commission of any
application made to them . . . shall not be called in question in any court
of law" did not oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. The
courts have managed to achieve such "straightforward" interpretations
by the familiar device of interpretative presumptions. The basic force of
this position is that any error of law puts the tribunal outside its
jurisdiction and places it within the supervisory jurisdiction of the
courts. Although Lord Diplock concedes that Parliament can deprive
the courts of all power, the present judicial disposition to privative
clauses makes that merely a theoretical rather than a practical
possibility. 98
This disingenuousness undermines the whole social compact
which the courts claim to uphold and enforce. By adhering to a
linguistic approach to statutory interpretation and hedging it with
defensive presumptions, the courts manage to constrain and dictate the
terms of Parliament's legislative competence. They impose a
constitutional and linguistic straight-jacket on the legislature. The

message from the judges to the legislators rings loud and clear"Use a
particular verbal formula if you want us to even consider
implementing your decisions. Even then, nothing is guaranteed.
Otherwise, you run the risk of having a different set of legal
consequences occur than you bargained for." Accordingly, the
general approach to statutory interpretation, especially when applied
to privative clauses, severely confines and often subverts the wishes
of Parliament. The rhetoric may be of constitutional partners, but the
reality is of constitutional competitors. While pretending to be a
bulwark against the usurpation of political power, the judicial
process usurps the legislative function. The ghost of Lord Coke is
alive and well; it stalks the corridors of legislative power.

D. The Marginality of Judicial Review

As a necessary corollary of assuming the management of the nation's
business, the State has established a pervasive network of administrative
agencies to carry out its decisions and plans. Indeed, a major reason for
the creation of such a bureaucratic enterprise was dissatisfaction with
the courts' performance. 99 There were doubts about their capacity
and willingness to handle effectively the problems of collective
consumption, especially when their traditional forte and preference
was for the protection of individual rights. 1 Also, the selective, but

systematic attempt to withdraw vast areas

of

administrative

competence from the judges through the enactment of privative
clauses is indicative of this trend. Moreover, a crude analysis and
comparison of judicial and administrative statistics provides ample
support for the marginal operation of judicial review.
Apart from other administrative bodies, there are about 2,000 separate
tribunals. Calculating very conservatively, there are over a million
administrative decisions made annually. However, only a minute fraction of
those decisions is reviewed by the courts. Although there has been an
increase in applications for judicial review, the ratio of applications for
judicial review of administrative decisions remains insignificant. Further, no
more than 25 per cent. of the handful of applications are successful.2 Also, a
successful application only means that a decision will be set aside or
quashed; it does not guarantee a favourable decision the second time around.
A litigant may win the legal battle, but lose the administrative war.
Nevertheless, while the resort to judicial review is a remote possibility, the
spectre of judicial intervention might have an exhortatory and intimidating
effect. Mindful of its possible invocation, the administrative process will
remedy its practices to conform to the doctrinal dictates of judicial review.
Such an argument places great and unjustified faith in the "inspirational"
impact of law.
Little work has been done on the social consequences of law. Modern
orthodoxy assumes the instrumental effect of legal precepts and decisions.
The small amount of empirical work carried out indicates that the social

impact of law has been vastly overestimated by lawyers.3 Any impact can be
more accurately attributed to legislative and regulatory intervention rather
than judicial activity.4 For instance, in America, judicial attempts to curb
and control the conduct of the police failed to improve its practices and, in
some instances, actually encouraged police perjury. 5 At best, the direct effect
of legal rules on public officials is problematic. Furthermore, lawyers often
assume that the impact will result in the intended conforming behaviour.
Initial research suggests that the impact of law is as likely to be indirect
and unintended as direct and intended.6 The indeterminacy of the courts'
educational effect results from the fact that "the meaning of judicial signals
is dependent on the information, experience, skill and resources that
disputants bring to them."7 As the reported transmissions of the courts are
minimal, the administrative audience will only be partially informed, even if
they are tuned in to the judicial wavelength. In fact, the Canadian
experience is that the corrective and inhibiting influences of judicial
decisions ought not be to taken for granted at all.8 Finance is a more
effective and important tool of control than adjudication.
There will, of course, be the landmark cases, such as Bromley and
Tameside, which loom large in the public consciousness. Although these are
of symbolic value, their importance must not be underrated. The widespread
attention devoted to such celebrated instances underlines the potent and
subtle "educative" force of the law. As Douglas Hay has so pertinently
observed, "ideologies do not rest on realities, however, but on appearances."9
Bromley and Tameside have not improved the lot of the sickly in National

Health Service hospitals, the homeless on the council housing waiting list,
the destitute at the Supplementary Benefit offices or the consumer of public
utilities.
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Such landmark cases are simply isolated instances presented as

evidence of the courts' continuing and pivotal involvement in the control of
the administration. These infrequent outbursts should not be mistaken for a
continuing and productive dialogue. Indeed, even the immediate effect of
Bromley was minimal; the G.L.C. achieved its general object of reduced fares.
In the immigration field, John Evans has conceded that, although it is not "a
complete irrelevance," judicial review has little effect on the administrative
process; initial dispositions survive procedural correction, subsequent rule
changes nullify judicial intervention, no effective modification of impugned
administrative behaviour occurs and there is continued ignorance by political
applicants of legal rights.11 Accordingly, judicial review is of marginal
"quantitative" significance.

III.

THE

"RAG TRADE" OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw SCHOLARSHIP

A. The Conceptual Clothiers

In the wake of the revived judicial interest in the administrative process, the
academic community has greeted enthusiastically the refreshed sources of raw
judicial material. Sadly, but predictably, most legal scholars have acted with
intellectual deference; they have been happy to follow rather than lead the
judges. As such, they have made no real contribution to the debate over the
pressing problems of the administrative process. With good cause, the
performance and record of most administrative scholars have been assessed as

"dismal."12 They have deliberately set their sights low. Conceiving of their
role as being "to expound the black-letter rules of law in such a way as to
reveal coherence, "13 they seem to relish their self-appointed role as bespoke
tailors to the Emperor. Using the available judicial data, they have spun a
whole invisible wardrobe of co-ordinated and voguish garments. In the
process, they have convinced themselves that the clothes are real and that
the Emperor is not naked. This craftsmanship has been given the
jurisprudential seal of approval by the master couturier, Ronald Dworkin. He
is adamant that "the judge must show the facts of history in the best light he
can, and this means that he must not show that history as unprincipled
chaos."14
In the search for coherence, there have evolved two main camps, the
"conceptualists" and the "ideologists." The former is by far the most
populous,

but there are important divisions among their ranks. The

conceptualists are united in their attempt to construct and defend a corpus of
doctrinal principles, which coalesce to form an effective, fair and objective
restraint on State action. This doctrine is claimed to be non-political in
origin and objective. At one extreme is a "classical group," headed by H. W.
R. Wade 15 and J. F. Garner. 16 Both fit judicial review into a very simple
constitutional design. Parliament delegates power to administrative bodies
which are accountable both legally and politically. While substantive policies
and merits of any decision are political issues, the courts ensure that

delegated power is not abused or misused. However, this does not
mean a complete subservience to the legislative will. The courts'

constitutional responsibility is to provide "adequate safeguards for the
reasonable interests of the individual."17 For both writers, parliamentary
sovereignty is a guiding principle of the English constitution. Another
principle is adherence to the Rule of Law. 18 As Wade observes, the
judges have sought to "preserve a deeper constitutional logic than that
of mere literal obedience to Parliament."19 The Rule of Law operates as
a bulwark against the powerful engines of State running amok.20
Moreover, Wade insists that the existing doctrine of judicial review is
devoid of political content or colouring; it represents a neutral and
necessary protection of the individual against the abuse of State
power.21 The fact that the revival of judicial activity coincides with the
growth of the modern regulatory state is presumably both appropriate
and necessary.
A more enlightened form of "conceptualist" scholarship has arisen
recently. Although de Smith rejects the simplistic "classical" approach
and concedes that judicial review is "inevitably sporadic and peripheral,
"22 he has little constructive to offer in its place. At bottom, he suggests
that the courts must maintain standards of formal legality and leave
substantive control to political forums.23 Whereas Wade and Garner
experience no doubts over the appropriateness of such foundational
premises, de Smith endures some crisis of confidence. Yet he seems
insufficiently disturbed to reject such premises entirely. He even goes so

far as to argue that "the degree of unity in the principles traceable in the
law of judicial review has been underestimated. "24 For de Smith, the
need to maintain legitimacy is prior to the need to develop a more
sophisticated, less constrained response to the administrative regime of the
collectivist state. Similarly, John Evans, while recognising that "judges
tend

institutionally

to conservatism," maintains

that "it is the

constitutional duty of the courts to give effect to the plain meaning of
legislative enactments even though this may result in great hardship or
injustice to individuals. "25 Despite their troubled consciences, de Smith
and Evans defer to what they view as the inevitable. Their progressive
sympathies are stifled by their adherence to the traditional ideology
which conceives of Parliament as the true source of democratic
expression and which the courts must blindly respect.
Such scholarly endeavours fail on two clear counts; they do not provide a
convincing account of existing judicial practice nor do they offer a satisfactory
plan for future judicial activity. There is ample evidence within the case law
to demonstrate judicial interference with the substantive

aspects of

administrative decisions. Indeed, the possibility of performing a purely
formal policing function is remote and suspect.26 Secondly, as a strategy for
reform, the "classical" theory is not only ideologically partisan, but fails to
preserve its thinly disguised political preferences. In so far as it advocates the
application of the common law rules of private law,27 it sanctions the courts'
application of the conservative brake of the common law to the more liberal

accelerator of legislation. Whereas modern legislation tends to be regulatory
and partially communitarian, the common law remains largely individualistic
and pathological. 28 Its commitment to individual autonomy in today's urban
and technological world is misplaced.

As such, the "classical" approach stymies the potential, but
restricted, impact of legislation; "the corollary of this judicial
deregulation is a

vision of laissez-faire individualism as

the

embodiment of a 'natural order' . . . that protects individuals from the
pervasiveness, inexplicability and uncertainty of regulatory law."29
Notwithstanding its commitment to and dependence on a minimal state,
the "classical" weapons are plainly inadequate for the task and a truly
"classical" model of judicial review may actually facilitate the spread
of the bureaucratic state. While the emphasis upon process and form
may result in the protection of individual interests in the occasional
dispute, individual interests cannot be effectively protected without
resort to substantive precepts. Moreover, the historical facts tell a very
different tale. During the supposed revival of administrative law, the
administrative process has gone from strength to strength. On the macrolevel, the impact of judicial review is difficult to detect.30 On the
microlevel, mindful that judicial dealings with the administrative
process are pathological, the increased number of applications for
judicial review by individuals indicates that all is not what it is made
out to be.

Recently,

a

"neo-classical"

approach

has begun

to gain

attention.

Recognising the simplism of the earlier work, it still maintains that it is

feasible to construct an adequate model of judicial review without the
courts being thrown into the political maelstrom of policy-making. For
instance, D. J. Galligan suggests that this can be achieved by courts
demanding that administrators meet the standards of rational decisionmaking; "a condition of the legitimacy and justifiability of the exercise of
any government power is that decisions be rational and that the powerholder be able to give reasons which both explain and seek to justify its
exercise."31 Each administrative decision must be capable of being
located within a wider complex of goals and policies. Paul Craig
supports those standards.32 Further, although he advocates substantive
intervention, he explicitly opts out of the search "to find an overarching
principle to guide us."33 Yet, it is not easy to identify or be convinced of
the causal link between increased formal rationality and substantive
justice. Indeed, it may simply serve to legitimate maladministration. The
breadth of the gap that can exist between reasons and action is
exemplified

by the judicial

pronouncements and performance in

administrative law.

B. The Ideological Tailors

While the "ideologists" are also engaged in the search for coherence,
they ins;st that the law is in a state of conceptual disarray. The

suggestion that there is a subtle, yet meaningful conceptual unity to
the case law that meets the dictates of constitutional democracy is
dismissed as nothing more than an academic's pipe-dream. Beneath the
conceptual chaos, they claim to have unearthed a disturbing ideological
coherence. The precise contom
:s of that ideology remain a matter of
dispute. For instance, J. A. G. Griffiths maintains that the Rule of Law
is only another mask for the rule of "conventional, established and
settled interests."34 Far from being a "neutral arbitral force,"35 the judges
are concerned to protect and preserve the existing order. With greater
sophistication,

Patrick

McAuslan

detects

a

similar

ideological

underpinning. Concentrating on planning law, he argues that the law
is devoted to maintaining the existing socio-economic order and to
frustrating the redistributive potential of law. In spite of appearances
to the contrary, administrative law is a tool "to maintain . . . the
existing state of property relations in society,"36 and evidences "a
predisposition towards individualism. "37
Like the conceptualists, the ideologists are guilty of reductionism.
While the basic thrust of their arguments is not contested, they
ignore and understate the subtle operation of legal doctrine. Although
both writers concede that the idea of the Rule of Law is not wholly
illusory, they appear to have no systemic, but only an ad hoc,
explanation for cases like Smith and Khawaja. Yet the frequency and

weight of such instances undermine their claim of coherence. The
judicial enterprise gravitates between competing ideologies. Apart from
ignoring the decisional facts, it is difficult to appreciate why any
particular mode of politico-economic organisation requires any given
set of rules. Indeed, such a view assumes that law has a direct
instrumental effect. The "capitalistic system of society" has weathered
the storm of collectivist legislation, welfare statism and industrial
nationalisation. It has adapted itself and, arguably, emerged stronger. In
the face of such resilience, it is difficult to accept that the "existing
order" demands a certain regime of judicial decisions to guarantee its
continued survival. Moreover, even if the whole judicial process was
willingly committed to the perpetuation of "capitalism," it is often
difficult to know why one particular rule in one particular situation is
necessarily demanded.

Within

the judicial

process

all is not

ideologically black or white; the shades of grey are rampant.
At bottom, English legal scholarship is atheoretical. Like the
English philosophical tradition, legal academics tend to be pragmatic and
functional. They are extremely suspicious of attempts at grand theorising,
38

instinctively

inclining toward

the practical

rather than the

philosophical. Although this lends an air of relevance and direction to
their work, it inhibits the development of long-term proposals.
Suggestions for reform tend to be piecemeal and incremental. Yet, for

there to be real change there must be a theory of change. For all his
critical energy, Professor Griffith has little to offer by way of
improvement. He seems content to despair and depose to the inevitable
continuance of the judicial and political status quo. Indeed, he seems to
believe that the conscious development of a set of general ground rules
by parliamentarians and improved draftinJt9 will "introduce order and
principle into this part of the law." McAuslan's position is less obvious.
While he advocates a genuine move toward greater public participation in
plannin§ law,41 he also seems to envisage a residual , role for the
courts.4

IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY

Legal scholars must redirect their considerable energies and imagination.43
No matter how efficient the judicial process becomes, it is a marginal
activity. To concentrate so much time and attention on the courts is to
reinforce the mistaken belief that the courts lie at the heart of the legal
and political process.44 Such misdirected activity diverts necessary talents
away from the critical scrutiny and improvement of other modes of
bureaucratic control.45 Moreover, the academic preoccupation with
judicial review insulates and shields the real sources of bureaucratic
maladministration

from

sustained

exposure

and

eradication.

A

combination of theory and action is demanded. The first step is
criticism of existing arrangements; this is a valuable source of

enlightenment and liberation in itself. As Unger warns, "until the central
problem . . . of domination is resolved, the search for community is
condemned to be idolatrous, or utopian, or both at once."46 However, it
is ill-advised to rush into constructing grand plans for the "good
society." No matter how well-intentioned, the replacement of one form
of domination by another must be studiously avoided. As much as
individuals are the victim, so they must become the liberators.47 The
challenge is to suggest tangible and viable programmes through which
society can rid itself of domination and begin to glimpse the way things
might be.
An obvious candidate for study is "participatory democracy."
Judicial review operates as a pale and perverse substitute for genuine
and vigorous popular involvement and control. Indeed, the need for
judicial review is premised on the failure of the institutional structure
of British democracy to ensure meaningful citizen participation in
government. At present, power is shuffled around among elite interest
groups and the State is captive to private interests.48 The forums of
popular

choice-legislature

and

market-are

deadlocked.

Popular

participation is reduced to the formal and sporadic ritual by which social
arrangements are justified as the product of citizen choice rather than the
imposition of elite preference. There must be "a revolution in democratic
consciousness. "49 A radical and substantive vision of a democratic

society has to be imagined and pursued. Democracy must become a
way of daily life and embrace the exercise of all social power, public
or private: "The idea of democracy is the cutting edge of the radical
critique, the best inspiration for change toward a more humane world,
the revolutionary idea of our time."50
Such a project might best be able to respect the imperatives of
historical contingency and social contradiction without becoming
enslaved to them. Normative discourse and political conversation would
be entrenched and the agenda of political debate and action would be
constantly revised. Far from having an ambition of utopian harmony,
a robust democracy would rely on disagreement and conflict as its
motive force. Legal scholars must turn their attention and energies
toward these challenging, but exciting possibilities. The tragic irony of
the present practice and doctrine of judicial review is its defence in the
name of democracy.

51

The. reality is that that legal institution has

helped to stymie the participatory initiative and dull the democratic
imagination. Legal scholars must commit themselves to arresting and
reversing this trend; "self-determination begins at home."52
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